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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a)(Rep. Vol. 9 1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Labor Commission err in concluding that an injury caused by 
lifting a fully loaded serving tray did not constitute an injury by accident within the 
meaning of the Worker's Compensation Act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The conclusion of the Labor Commission as to whether a given set of 
facts constitutes an accidental injury within the meaning of the Worker's 
Compensation Act is a legal conclusion which can be reviewed without deference 
to the Commission, though the Commission may be granted some discretion when 
applying a legal standard to a given set of facts. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 
P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Resolution of this case turns on an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-401 (Rep. Vol. 4B 1997) (previously appearing at Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-45). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jessica Jacobsen was employed as a waitress at the Hilton Hotel. She 
suffered an injury to her arm, shoulder and neck on May 6, 1992, while lifting a 
large oval serving tray, weighing between 16.5 and 30 pounds, filled with meals 
onto her left shoulder (R. 614-15). Ms. Jacobsen sought worker's compensation 
benefits as a result of her injury. Her employer denied her claim, asserting that 
she had a preexisting disability to her neck and that her work activities when 
injured did not constitute unusual exertion, as required to constitute an injury by 
accident in the face of a preexisting condition. 
The administrative law judge initially hearing the claim failed to find any 
preexisting condition and awarded benefits. The employer filed a motion for 
review with the Industrial Commission and submitted a medical report from an 
examining physician indicating that Ms. Jacobsen did have a preexisting 
osteoarthritic condition in her neck. The Industrial Commission determined that 
Ms. Jacobsen was suffering from a preexisting condition, but affirmed her award 
of benefits on the basis of the cumulative trauma she suffered during the course of 
her employment with the Hilton. 
The employer appealed to this Court, which held that the Commission 
had erred in applying the cumulative trauma standard because Ms. Jacobsen's 
application for hearing alleged only a single traumatic event. Hilton Hotel v. 
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Industrial Comm'n, 897 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995). The case was remanded for 
a determination of whether the lifting of the tray constituted unusual exertion. 
On remand, the administrative law judge found that Ms. Jacobsen's 
injurious activity did constitute unusual exertion and awarded benefits. 
The employer sought review by the Labor Commission, which reversed 
the award after concluding that Ms. Jacobsen's work activity did not amount to 
unusual exertion. (See Order Granting Motion for Review in the Addendum to 
this brief.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The act of Ms. Jacobsen in lifting a large serving tray with one hand, 
while simultaneously balancing the tray and shifting it to her shoulder, constitutes 
unusual exertion when compared with that of typical nonemployment activity. 
Because the nature of her exertion when injured was, at a minimum, at least 
arguably unusual, the Labor Commission acted unreasonably in denying her 
benefits in light of the mandate that the Worker's Compensation Act should be 
interpreted in such a manner that any doubt respecting the right to compensation 
must be resolved in favor of the injured worker. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF 
BENEFITS CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE 
FAILURE TO INTERPRET THE WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION ACT FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
INJURED EMPLOYEES. 
In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the test for determining whether an injured worker who 
suffered from a preexisting condition which contributes to the claimed industrial 
injury has met her burden of establishing the legal causation element of her claim. 
The Court held that 
where the claimant suffers from a 
preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no preexisting 
condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is 
sufficient. 
729 P.2d at 26. The Court, though adopting no fixed standard for determining 
what constituted unusual or extraordinary exertion, emphasized that the injurious 
work activity should be compared with "the usual wear and tear and exertions of 
nonemployment life . . . . " Id. 
Petitioner submits that the typical nonemployment life activities of the 
usual person does not include lifting large oval serving trays, weighing between 
16.5 and 30 pounds, with one hand while simultaneously balancing the loaded tray 
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as it is repositioned to the shoulder. The administrative law judge who decided 
this case after remand agreed. 
Ms. Jacobsen's tray was loaded with 
dishes, filled with food, all prone to 
moving or spilling while she lifted above 
shoulder height and to one side. This 
manner of lifting is not typical in 
nonemployment activities. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at page 4. The Labor 
Commission, however, disagreed, believing that the lifting episode to be equivalent 
to lifting boxes onto shelves for storage as one might in their nonemployment life. 
Given that each of these evaluations has plausibility, the question arises as to what 
standard this Court should apply in reviewing the Commission's Order. Two 
recent panels of this Court have held that the legislature has given the Commission 
discretion to interpret the Worker's Compensation Act and that its interpretations 
are, therefore, given some deference and only reversed if they are unreasonable. 
See Osman Home Imp, v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.2d 240 (Utah App. 1998); 
Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1997). Assuming that this 
intermediate level of review is the correct standard, petitioner submits that in 
situations where injurious work activity is subject to reasonable arguments on both 
sides of the issue of whether it is unusual, it is unreasonable for the Commission 
not to resolve that debate in favor of the injured worker. This is so because of the 
fundamental purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act, which is to provide 
-5-
economic protection for employees who sustain injuries arising out of their 
employment to "alleviate hardship upon workers and their families." Baker v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965). Our Supreme 
Court has held that 
[t]o give effect to that purpose, the Act 
should be liberally construed and applied 
to provide coverage" and that "[a]ny doubt 
respecting the right of compensation will 
be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee. 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997)(quoting State Tax 
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 [Utah 1984]). 
Even assuming the Commission has some discretion to interpret the Act, 
that interpretation must be consistent with the recognized purpose of the Act and 
with the principles of its interpretation previously articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court. As the Supreme Court has expressly announced that in cases where it is 
fairly questionable whether an employee is entitled to compensation that question 
must be resolved in her favor, it was unreasonable for the Commission not to 
apply that rule in its interpretation of the Act in this case. 
The rule which should be announced in this case, and applied to this 
case, is that if a worker's injurious exertion is subject to fair debate as to whether 
it was unusual or extraordinary, the Commission must, consistent with the 
previously enunciated law of this State, resolve that issue in favor of the injured 
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worker. If this Court fails to adopt such a standard, then workers suffering from 
preexisting disabilities are subject to denial of benefits from injuries suffered at 
work solely on the basis of the subjective beliefs of individual commissioners 
regarding what is usual exertion, which beliefs become unreviewable if they can be 
said to be other than irrational. Such a system for claim adjudication is at odds 
with the Supreme Court's announced rule of law, oft repeated, that doubts 
regarding compensation eligibility are to be resolved in the favor of the injured 
employee. See, e.g., McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); 
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948). 
In order for this admonition of the Supreme Court to be anything other 
than an empty platitude, the Commission must be directed to award benefits in 
those cases where the unusual nature of the employee's exertion is subject to fair 
debate and reversed when it fails to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Jacobsen was injured while engaged in an employment activity that 
was, at a minimum, arguably an unusual exertion. Because the Worker's 
Compensation Act must be interpreted to resolve any doubt about an employee's 
entitlement to compensation in the employee's favor, it was unreasonable for the 
Commission to conclude that Ms. Jacobsen's injury was not the result of unusual 
-7-
exertion and its order should be vacated and the award of the administrative law 
judge reinstated. 
DATED this */lL day of September, 1998. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By ?*.//m~ie£4LsC. 
M. David Eckersley ^ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
-8-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 1998, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart L. Poelman 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TV 
G \EA\MDE\JACOBSEN\BRIEF 
10642-1 
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ADDENDUM 
(i >.,( * \ i: i J » ' \ i. % < i K < * 11 v J L v j i, :::>::::) I \ 1,f < 
JESSICA D. JACOBSEN, 
Applicant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE HILTON and UNITED 
P \CIFIC RELIANCE INS! JRANCE, 
Defendants 
Salt Lake Hilton and its workers compensation insurance carrier, United Pacific Reliance 
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Hilton" hereafter), ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Jessica D. Jacobsen under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act (Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated; "the Act" hereafter), 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion, for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann,. §63-46b-12,1 Jtah Code Ann. §34A-?-80!<3) -JMC I r-h Admin. Code R602-2-1 .M. 
ISSUE PRKSKM i.o 
Did Ms, Jacobsen's lifting and balancing of a food tray while working for Hilton constitute 
an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" so as to meet the test for legal causation established iii Allen 
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Because Ms. Jacobsen's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits depends on the precise 
nature of the work-related activity that led to her injury, the Labor Commission has carefully 
reviewed the evidence on that point. The record establishes that prior to the events that gave rise to 
Ms. Jacobsen's claim for workers' compensation benefits, she had worked as a waitress for Hilton 
for some time. Her work duties included transporting food items from the kitchen to her customers' 
tables. Ms. Jacobsen typically accomplished this task by placing a large oval tray on a platform 
outside the kitchen area known as the "food service station." The platform was slightly less than 
chest high. Vis. Jacobsen would load the tray with various food items, then lift the tray to her left 
shoulder to carry the food items to restaurant patrons' tables. 
Ms. Jacobsen's injur}' occurred during her work shift on the evening of May 6, 1992, 
Following her usual practice, she attempted to lift a loaded tray from the food service station to her 
shoulder. The tray weighed between 16 and 30 pounds. Ms. Jacobsen placed her left hand under 
* 
* ORDFRGRVNiING 
* \ ? o n n \ FOR RFVTFW 
* 
* 
Lnsv INII, *U <)M 
ORDER CHANTING MOTION FOR RKVU'W 
II SMi A i). I \COBSEN 
I'" \<;K 2 
the tray and steadied it with her right hand., She bent her knees slightly and lifted the tray to her left 
shoulder, a vertical distance of between 12 and 18 inches. There is no evidence that the tray was 
unbalanced or unstable. As she lifted the tray, Ms. Jacobsen felt pain in her upper back and left arm, 
and numbness in her left hand. She now seeks benefits for these injuries. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
,o qualify for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, an injured worker must 
establish, among other elements, that the injuries result from an accident "arising out of and in the 
course of employment." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-40L. In order to meet this test, the injured worker 
must prove both "legal causation" and "medical causation". Allen v. industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). It is the issue of "legal causation" that is in dispute in Ms. Jacobsen's claim. 
In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 i'...,i n, A 1082 (Utah 10R(i), the 
Utah Supreme Court described the test for legal causation as fol:-**-
Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertiuii, M> lung a it i^  an activity connected with 
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause However, i: Uie claimant 
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment 
activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." . . . . The requirement of 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" is designed to screen out those injuries that result 
from a personal condition which tho worker brings to tlv j^b, nnher than from 
exertions required of the employee in the workplac- {("nations omitted.) 
It has previously been determined that, prior to the events of May 6, 1992, Ms. Jacobsen 
suffered from a preexisting spinal condition which is related to the injuries for which she now seeks 
benefits. Consequently, the Commission must hold Ms. Jacobsen to the higher standard of legal 
causation with respect to her claim. She must show that her activity of lifting the loaded serving tray 
that evening amounted to an unusual or extraordinary exertion. To determine whether an activity 
constitutes an unusual or extraordinary exertion, the Labor Commission must evaluate the activity 
against the kinds of activities that are commonly experienced in modem nonindustrial life. Allen 
at 26. 
Ms. Jacobsen reports her injury resulted from lifting a loaded serving tray weighing between 
16 and 30 lbs from approximately chest level to her shoulder. There is no evidence the tray was 
unbalanced or unstable. Ms. Jacobsen was able to use her right hand to stabilize the tray while she 
lifted the tray from below with her left hand. [lie Labor Commission considers Ms. Jacobsen's 
exertion as similar to lifting boxes or other items onto a closet or garage shelf, or some other storage 
area. Her exertion also is comparable to lifting items into airplane overhead storage racks and 
participating in various sporting or exercise activities. It is also similar to lifting and playing with 
JESSICA D. JA<:<)KSFN 
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small children Other activities involving similar exertion could be cited as well. As such, Ms. 
Jacobsen's exertion was neither unusual nor extraordinary when compared to the activities of 
modern everyda\ '\l . 
i.. ii&hi of the foregoing, the I .abor Commission concludes that Ms. Jacobsen has failed to 
meet the applicable test for legal causation as established by Allen. Consequently, her claim is ilot 
compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
ORDER 
The Labor Commission grants Hilton's motion for review and reverses the decision of the 
ALJ in this matter. Ms. Jacobsen's claim for workers' compensation benefits relating to her work 
accident of May 6, 1992 is hereby denied. It is so cjrdered. 
Dated thi^ j ^ . d ' a y of April, 1WS 
NOTK Ko.i. All L,\ L I G H T S 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider tllis Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Commissioner 
JESSICA I). .1 WORSEN 
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